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Abstract
Economists have a limited understanding of how sensitive human capital investment is to
information about aptitude or likelihood of success. We shed light on this by estimating if
students update their college choices in response to large positive and negative information
shocks generated by the release of SAT scores. Using new data on when students select colleges
to receive their scores, we find that positive shocks cause students to choose more selective
colleges that charge higher tuition and have higher graduation rates. Updating is significant for
students from high and low income households and for minority and non-minority students.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature examines how students update their beliefs about their own aptitude during
college and how this affects dropout decisions and choice of major (e.g. Zafar, 2011; Arcidiacono,
Hotz, and Kang, 2012; Stange, 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012 and 2013; Wiswall and
Zafar, 2015; and Arcidiacono et al. 2015). This paper provides a direct analogue at another crucial
time for human capital investment – when students decide where to apply to college. Understanding
how students’ beliefs about their own aptitude and likelihood of success affects their college choices
is important in light of evidence that there are significant returns to college quality.1 We examine if
students update their college portfolios in response to large positive and negative information shocks
generated by the SAT – one of the most important components of a student’s college application.2
If students do not significantly update in response to new information about academic aptitude,
it suggests that college portfolios are essentially predetermined by pre-existing beliefs and socio-
economic factors.
The primary challenge to estimating student responses to information about aptitude and
performance is the need to observe a panel of both college choices and the information available to
students at a given point in time. A student reveals only one college portfolio and, in many cases,
receives only one college entrance exam score. To overcome this, we exploit a unique policy and
new data that allow us to observe the same students choosing colleges of interest before and after
learning their scores. Specifically, the College Board allows students to identify a limited number of
colleges to receive their scores for free at the time that they register for the exam.3 Subsequently,
students learn their score on the exam and choose if and where to send additional reports. Using a
new data set that indicates the exact date when each college was selected by the student, we are able
to estimate the effect of SAT information shocks on the college application process.4 Conditional
on sending more score reports, an unanticipated positive (negative) shock in SAT score causes a
student to select a portfolio of colleges that has higher (lower) selectivity, tuition, graduation rates,
and fraction of private colleges. However, the estimated effects are modest relative to cross-sectional
estimates, indicating that factors such as household resources and expectations result in significant
inertia in college choice.
Several factors make this environment a nearly ideal context for identifying updating of
college choices. First, selecting colleges to receive SAT score reports is a high stakes decision
1See, for example, Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996), Black and Smith (2006), Hoekstra (2009), and
Cohodes and Goodman (2014).
2As noted in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012), changes that “arise as students learn about their academic
ability” are a “prominent alternative” to the financial explanations that dominate the literature on college enrollment
decisions.
3See Pallais (2015) for analysis revealing that students tend to use each of their four free score reports. We
observe that more than three-quarters of SAT takers use at least one of their free reports, and about two-thirds of
these students use all four.
4This makes progress toward addressing the issue detailed in, for example, Zifar (2011) which notes that “little is
known about how students form expectations and resolve uncertainty in the context of schooling choices” and this
area is “relatively unexplored because studying this question requires following individuals over time and obtaining
data that directly identify new information”.
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that can impact a student’s college outcome. Second, the data include students’ Preliminary SAT
(PSAT) scores and, in many cases, multiple SAT attempts. This allows us to estimate how new
information from the first or second SAT score changes portfolio choice relative to old information
such as the PSAT score (i.e. do students re-weight their decisions away from old information
and toward new information). Third, many students appear to experience very large positive and
negative realizations of scores that are difficult to predict: the standard deviation of within-student
differences between first and second SAT scores is 70.3 points. Fourth, students make their pre-
exam college choices shortly before taking the SAT, limiting the potential that the results are
caused by time-varying factors that are correlated with exam performance.5 Finally, the analysis is
based on administrative population data that produces precise estimates and allows us to consider
heterogeneous effects across important socio-economic characteristics such as income and race.
We develop an empirical model based on those in the employer learning literature to motivate
the empirical design.6 The model allows for information that is observable only to the student and
not the researcher and for application strategies that are correlated with aptitude. The model
reveals several testable implications that form the basis for the implementation and interpretation
of the reduced form empirical analysis. Specifically, the model predicts updating toward the SAT
and away from the PSAT for one-time takers and toward each SAT as it is revealed for those who
take the exam multiple times. The model also reveals a natural test of, and correction for, students
anticipating their scores.7
Identification is based on a difference-in-difference style design that estimates the extent
to which college portfolios selected before and after students learn their scores reflect this new
information. We find that a student who scores 100 points higher on the SAT is likely to apply
to colleges whose matriculates scored about 7 points higher on the exam. This indicates that a 1
standard deviation change in a student’s score results in an approximately 0.12 standard deviation
shift in the selectivity of their portfolio.8 To put this in perspective, cross-sectional estimates suggest
that 100 points on the SAT is correlated with an approximately 20 point increase in portfolio
selectivity after conditioning on a rich set of covariates. Thus inertia in beliefs and unobserved
differences across students and households (such as parental knowledge and expectations) result in
new information closing about one-third of the portfolio gap evident in the cross-section. There
5A natural concern is that changes in portfolio composition and exam performance over time are caused by a
concurrent time-varying factor such as performance in school. However, students select their pre-exam portfolios
shortly before taking the SAT, not a year earlier when they take the PSAT. Thus, the pre-exam portfolio should
reflect time-varying factors that are correlated with SAT performance.
6The model is most closely related to those in Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Lange
(2007). The updating that occurs as students learn their aptitude shares similarities to the updating by employers
as they observe the performance of employees (Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo, 2010; Rockoff et al., 2012; Kahn and
Lange 2014). Student beliefs and updating play a significant role in theoretical models of college choice (Manski,
1989; Altonji, 1993; Altonji, Blom, and Meghir, 2012).
7Specifically, it is possible to measure the extent to which students appear to incorporate their future, unrealized
SAT score into current portfolio choices. This would occur if, for example, students could predict their scores using
factors that are unobserved in the data.
8Putting the estimates in terms of standard deviations is helpful in this context due to the fact that SAT scores
have greater variance than application portfolios. Figure 1 presents the distribution of SAT scores, which have a
standard deviation of 200 points, and college portfolios, which have a standard deviation of 110 points.
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is a similar pattern of effects for a wide range of college characteristics. For example, a 100 point
higher score increases the average annual tuition of selected colleges by 400 dollars, corresponding
to 6 percent of average in-state public tuition, or 0.14 standard deviations.
Among students who take the exam two times, the selectivity and composition of colleges
selected after learning the score for the first exam more closely reflect that score and likewise for
colleges selected after learning the second score, while the importance of the PSAT score deteriorates
with each revealed SAT score.9 Importantly, the results reveal that students do not incorporate
information from the second score when only the first score has been released, providing strong
evidence that students do not anticipate future scores (i.e. that score variation is truly a shock).
The results hold when allowing students to adopt application strategies that may be correlated with
aptitude, such as applying more or less conservatively after the exam. While students generally
apply more conservatively after receiving their scores, those who receive positive shocks appear to
incorporate new information more than those who receive negative shocks. Further, changes in
the portfolio appear to be driven by students applying more aggressively to “reach” colleges with
little change in the least selective “safety” colleges. Interestingly, updating is relatively similar
in magnitude for students from high and low income households, for males and females, and for
students of different races.
On the extensive margin, there is little evidence that students are more likely to add colleges
to their portfolios in response to score shocks. Specifically, students who experience a score shock
with a magnitude of 100 points are less than one percentage point more likely to send reports to
additional colleges. This suggests that students who update their beliefs the most are not over
or under represented in the analysis. In contrast, the number of colleges in students’ portfolios is
significantly correlated with household income and college readiness as measured by high school
grade point average. Thus, the estimates should be interpreted with the awareness that higher
income and better performing students are over-represented.
Higher scores on the SAT are likely to indicate an increased probability of admission and
greater potential for success in college. Thus sensitivity to feedback in this context is consistent
with findings in the literature that students who earn poor grades in college are more likely to drop
out and that those who perform well gravitate toward more challenging majors. Altering portfolio
choice in response to aptitude could partially reflect beliefs about expected returns from attending
more and less selective colleges. The literature has frequently found that students alter human
capital investment in response to perceived returns (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009; Jensen, 2010;
Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014) and expectations (Jacob and Linkow, 2011). The results in this paper
are consistent with the finding in Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2014) that the labels assigned to
No Child Left Behind test scores affect subsequent college outcomes and that parental perceptions
of child aptitude affect human capital investment (Dizon-Ross, 2014).10 The finding that revealed
9To abstract from selection into taking the SAT one or two times, the identification design is replicated using a
merged sample of one and two-time takers. The resulting estimates closely mirror those found when considering the
two groups separately.
10Interestingly, Card and Krueger (2005) find no effect of eliminating affirmative action on the portfolios of minority
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academic aptitude matters but plays an incomplete role in shaping college choice is consistent
with results in the literature that college choices are sensitive to non-academic factors such as
the availability of college counseling services (Avery and Kane 2004; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2012),
information about the cost of college (Bettinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner, 2014), and ease
of access to entrance exams (Klasik, 2013; Hurwitz et al., 2014; Goodman, 2014; Bulman, 2015),
as well as evidence of mismatch between students and colleges (Hoxby and Avery, 2012; Smith,
Pender, and Howell, 2013; Dillon and Smith, 2016).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy and new administrative data
used to conduct the analysis. Section 3 introduces an empirical framework of student updating and
identifies several testable implications. Section 4 presents the primary specifications and results.
Section 5 discusses the implications of the findings.
2 SAT Scores and College Score Reports
This paper examines if students update their college portfolios in response to new information
about their college-readiness and the strength of their applications. The importance of learning
about aptitude for college choice depends on two factors: the weight that students place on the new
information, such as SAT scores; and the magnitude of the information shock in terms of how much
it deviates from prior expectations. Panel data provides an opportunity to factor out unobserved,
time-invariant individual and household characteristics and beliefs that influence college choices.11
There are, however, two fundamental challenges for employing a panel data approach in this and
related contexts. First, many outcomes of interest are one-time decisions that are not observed
repeatedly. For example, in the typical progression, students only choose one college application
portfolio, which is not conducive to observing changes over time. Second, a panel data approach
requires new information that is not anticipated by students and is observed by the researcher.
While students may receive large positive and negative shocks when they learn their SAT score,
this is of little use if the researcher cannot account for students’ prior expectations.
This paper exploits a unique policy and a rich new dataset from the College Board to estimate
the effect of information shocks generated by SAT scores on college choices. A student has only one
revealed college application portfolio, but they often construct this portfolio by selecting colleges
at different times. We exploit administrative data that reveal the exact timing of when students
send score reports to colleges. Further, the College Board’s pricing policy induces students to select
some schools to receive their SAT score before they learn their results. Our panel data thus consists
students despite reducing the likelihood of admission.
11Estimating the importance of aptitude is inherently problematic in cross-sectional data. The choice of where to
apply is a function of many student and household characteristics. Some of these characteristics are both observable
and measurable (household income, parental education, student grade point average, and geographic location), but
may not be included in a single data source. Many other characteristics are difficult to measure or are unlikely to
be included in any data source (e.g. parental expectations, parental familiarity with the college application process,
student motivation, resources of extended family, high school quality, peer effects). If any of these characteristics is
correlated with both the measure of student aptitude and college choice, then the estimated effects in a cross-sectional
analysis will be biased.
5
of information periods: the portfolio selected before learning one’s score, and the portfolio selected
after learning one’s score. Further, nearly half of students take the exam a second time. This
generates a third information period in which students may adapt to new information on aptitude.
Multi-time takers also provide a natural test of the extent to which students anticipate scores, as
we can measure the time-varying response to future score that have not been revealed yet.
2.1 SAT Data
The analysis is based on the population of SAT takers who graduated from high school between
2007 and 2009.12 The SAT is a college entrance exam administered by the College Board and is
taken by high school students across the country, typically in their junior or senior years, if not
both. The exam is comprised of math and critical reading sections scored between 200 and 800,
so students can receive a combined score between 400 and 1600.13 Each section was normalized
to have a mean score of 500 and a standard deviation of 110 in 1995. Along with student scores
on each SAT attempt, the data contain Preliminary SAT/ National Merit Scholarship Qualifying
Test (PSAT) scores, which is a test similar to the SAT but taken in one’s sophomore or junior year
of high school. The College Board also administers a questionnaire upon exam registration that
includes information on high school GPA, race, parental income, high school attended, and home
zip code.
2.2 College Score Sends
Our analysis relies on observing student Score Sends, which are official SAT score reports that
students have sent to colleges for consideration in the application process. The reports measure
student interest in colleges and previous studies have argued that they are a reasonable proxy for
applications (Card and Krueger, 2005; Pallais, 2015). Score Sends are especially advantageous
for measuring updating in this setting as they reveal the intended application portfolios before
and after the SAT even if the actual applications are only sent after all information has been
revealed.14 The score report data include two pieces of important information. First, it reveals
the college to which the report is directed. Each report sent to a four-year college is merged with
college characteristics from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (NCES IPEDS).15 Second, the data include the exact date that students
request each report. When registering for the SAT, students have the option to send their scores to
four colleges for no additional cost. Importantly, this must be done within nine days of taking the
12The choice of cohorts is determined by two constraints: the availability of data revealing when score reports are
sent; and the transition to a system in which students could choose which scores were sent to colleges.
13A writing section was introduced in 2005 but not all students take this section and not all colleges use it in the
admissions process.
14For example, a student who chooses to send her score to an elite college prior to taking the SAT may not apply
after receiving a lower than expected score. This is precisely the updating of beliefs that the paper is designed to
estimate but would be obscured if only the final application portfolios were observed.
15Some colleges, typically two-year colleges or specialty colleges (e.g. religious or arts) do not report all of the
measures of selectivity used in this analysis.
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exam, so a high fraction of takers send reports prior to the exam. After the ten day period (or for
additional reports prior to the ten day expiration), scores may be sent for a fee of approximately 11
dollars each.16 During the period of analysis, reports sent to colleges contained every score earned
by the student.17 Colleges do not automatically receive a new report if a student retakes the exam.
Thus reports may be sent multiple times to the same college, which is particularly common among
students who improve their scores.
For students who took the SAT once, score reports are divided into those requested before
taking the exam and those requested after the scores are released.18 We calculate the average
characteristics of the colleges in each of these two periods, including the SAT scores of matriculating
students, in-state tuition, graduation rate, and fraction private. Thus reports may be selected
during three periods for students who took the exam twice: those selected prior to the first exam;
those selected after the first score is released but before the second exam is taken, including reports
that are free with the second registration; and those selected after the second exam scores are
released. We calculate the average characteristics of the colleges in each of the three periods.
2.3 Analytic Sample
The sample for analysis includes all students in the U.S. who took the PSAT and SAT and who
sent at least one score report prior to taking the SAT. The PSAT is taken by more than 75 percent
of SAT takers and provides students with one measure of how they may perform. Approximately
75 percent of students send at least one free score report to a college and nearly two-thirds of
score-senders use all four of their free score reports. These reports allow us to observe the types of
colleges a student is considering prior to receiving new information. Analysis of revised portfolio
composition is conditional on students sending score reports after taking the SAT. We explicitly
estimate the determinants of sending additional reports and discuss the implications for interpreting
the estimates.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for demographic characteristics and test scores in the
sample. Over 627,000 students took the SAT once and 534,000 took it twice. Approximately 46
percent are males and 59 percent are white. Mean PSAT scores are about 100, which is approxi-
mately equivalent to a 1000 on the SAT. Students who took the SAT once have an average score
of 1009, while students who took it twice earned a 1038 on their first attempt and a 1064 on the
second attempt, on average. Approximately 21 percent of one-time takers sent scores after the
exam and 32 percent of two-time takers did so after the second exam.
16Note that students from low income households are eligible to use additional free Score Sends.
17Score Choice was adopted in the spring of 2009, whereby students could choose which SAT scores to send if there
were multiple administrations. A small number of students in the 2009 cohort may have used Score Choice, but most
students do not take the SAT after the fall of their senior year (the fall of 2008).
18Score Sends requests are delayed until new scores are available, so the analysis is based on the request date rather
than the fulfillment date. Requests that come immediately after the exam is taken but before the scores are released
are excluded. Such requests are relatively uncommon and are excluded due to the fact that they may reflect partial
treatment (as the student has taken the exam but not learned his or her score).
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2.4 Within-Student Variation in Scores
There is significant within-student variation in scores earned on the PSAT and the first and second
taking of the SAT. This variation is important for two reasons. First, unpredictable variation in
scores generates the information shocks necessary for identification of updating. We explicitly test
for the extent to which students anticipate scores in Section 4. Second, the magnitude of the
variation determines the importance of updating in practice.
The top graph in Figure 2 presents the distribution of the differences between each students’
first SAT score and their PSAT score (after the PSAT has been multiplied by 10 to be on the same
scale). While the mean is close to 0, the standard deviation of the difference is 85.6 points. That is,
a student who earns a 1000 on the PSAT has an approximately 30 percent chance of earning a score
lower than a 900 or greater than 1100 on the SAT. To examine the extent to which factors other
than the PSAT may help to explain this variation, we generate a predicted SAT score using a rich
set of observables in addition to the PSAT, including pre-exam portfolio selectivity, high school
GPA, and demographic characteristics.19 The bottom graph in Figure 2 presents the difference
between each student’s actual and predicted SAT score. The standard deviation of the difference
is 80.5 points. That is, the rich set of observable academic and socioeconomic characteristics has
essentially no additional explanatory power for predicting the SAT beyond the PSAT. This suggests
that: a) the PSAT score is the most important predictor of a student’s SAT score for the researcher
and perhaps the student as well; and b) there is significant within-student variation in exam scores.
Within-student variation in scores is also evident in multiple takings of the SAT. The top
graph in Figure 3 presents the distribution of the differences between students’ second SAT score
and their first score among those who take the exam twice. The standard deviation of the difference
is 70.3 points. This variation is especially interesting considering that the exams are, by design,
equally difficult and cover the same body of knowledge. The time gap between when students take
the exam the first and second time is frequently quite small. Note that while students perform
slightly better on average the second time they take the exam (the mean of the difference is 26
points), this increase is small relative to the variation in scores. Nearly 40 percent of students earn
a lower score when they take the exam again. This is notable as repeat takers have months of
additional time for test preparation, experience taking the exam, and may have chosen to retake
in part because they believe that they had a bad draw the first time. This suggests that there is
significant noise in performance. Each student’s second score is predicted using the same list of
observables as above in addition to the first SAT score. The resulting differences are presented in
the bottom graph in Figure 3. The standard deviation of the difference is 63.6 points. That is, even
with two measures of prior SAT scores in hand, the PSAT and the first SAT, student performance
is difficult to predict.
19Specifically, the predicted SAT score is estimated using a fixed effect for each possible PSAT score; an indicator
for whether the student took the PSAT as a sophomore or junior; a cubic polynomial in the selectivity of pre-SAT
portfolio (as measured by the average SAT score of matriculating students); fixed effects for high school grade point
average; gender; fixed effects for race; fixed effects for parental income level; and a fixed effect for the year the exam
was taken.
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This description suggests that one’s SAT score is difficult to anticipate, as students are
approximately equally likely to score above or below their previous scores and the magnitude of
the variation is large. Further, it is very difficult to predict the direction of the variation even with
a rich set of ability and socio-economic characteristics. This descriptive analysis of score shocks is
supplemented with explicit estimates of test score anticipation in Section 4. That analysis exploits
the realization that if students anticipate their scores then future scores will be incorporated into
current portfolio choice. There is little evidence that this is the case, suggesting that the score
shocks observed by the researcher are highly correlated with the true score shocks experienced by
the student.
2.5 Cross-Sectional Differences
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional relationship of portfolio selectivity with academic and non-
academic factors. The resulting coefficients provide baseline context for the causal estimates pre-
sented in Section 4. We regress college portfolio selectivity (as measured by the average SAT score
of matriculating students) on a student’s PSAT score, SAT score, and observable characteristics
including race, household income, high school attended. For one time takers, a 100 point difference
in SAT score is correlated with a 20 point difference in selectivity. Thus a one standard deviation
in exam score is correlated with an approximately 0.4 standard deviation difference in portfolio
selectivity. Among two-time takers, each 100 points on the second SAT is correlated with an 18
point difference in portfolio selectivity. High school grade point average and socio-economic factors
are also strongly correlated with the college students select. A one point change in grade point
average, the difference between an A and B high school student, corresponds to a change of 30
to 50 points in portfolio selectivity, which is equivalent to about 200 points on the SAT. After
controlling for student scores and grades, the difference in portfolio selectivity for households with
income between 50,000 and 100,000 relative to those with more than 100,000 dollars is about 7
points.
3 Empirical Framework
Identification in this paper is based on a difference-in-difference style design that reveals if students
shift their beliefs away from old information and toward new information after an SAT score is
revealed. The simplicity of the design lends itself to ease of interpretation and to several important
tests of validity. To better understand how updating might influence college application decisions
and to enrich the interpretation of the empirical results, we develop an empirical model in the
spirit of the employer learning models of Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001),
and Lange (2007). Our main departure is that, rather than employers learning about ability from
signals of productivity that are unobservable to the econometrician, students receive signals directly
from information they did not originally possess. The model produces several testable implications
beyond those immediately apparent from the reduced form design. Note that while students who
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take the SAT one time and two times are modeled separately, we realize that this is a choice and
replicate the empirical estimates with a joint sample.
An individual forms beliefs about her optimal college application portfolio which can be
summarized by a single continuous measure of quality y.20 The optimal portfolio is a function of
ability that can be divided into four components: s is a set of ability correlates which are observable
to both the student and the researcher (e.g. PSAT scores); q is a set of ability correlates which
are observable to the student, but not the researcher (e.g. personal essays); z is the true SAT
score that a student would receive in the absence of measurement error; and η is a set of ability
correlates that are unobservable to both the student and the researcher (e.g. confidential letters
of recommendation). The student will observe signals of z throughout the application process,
the timing and content of which are known ex ante to the researcher.21 Our main interest is in
testing the student’s response to these signals. Without loss of generality, we impose that η is
uncorrelated with z.22 The distribution of (s, q, z, η) is assumed to be jointly normal with non-
negative correlations across vectors. This assumption has been made previously in the learning
literature (e.g., Lange, 2007), makes the model tractable, and there are several opportunities in the
empirical analysis to examine if it is reasonable. Following the employer learning literature, the
optimal portfolio for student i is assumed to be linear in each of these elements,
yi = δqi + rsi + Λzi + ηi (1)
where the right-hand side is the student’s true ability and is normalized to be in units of optimal
portfolio choice as it has no natural scale. Hereafter we drop the subscript i when it will not cause
confusion.
3.1 One-Time Takers
Students who take the SAT only one time face two time periods t in which to select colleges. When
t = 0, students send applications without knowledge of their SAT score. When t = 1, students send
applications having received their SAT score, z1. Beginning in t = 0, students form expectations
on their unobservable factors z and η using their observable factors s and q. It follows from joint
20We abstract from the method by which a student determines the optimal portfolio and only assume that there
is a monotonic relationship between the quality of a portfolio and student characteristics. For theoretical treatments
of the portfolio choice problem see, for example, Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006), Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011),
and Fu (2014).
21The model differentiates between a true SAT score and the score a student actually receives as this allows the
full set of SAT scores to matter for the application decision for individuals who take the SAT multiple times. For
students who take the exam only once, imposing that there is no measurement error and that the received score is
equal to z would have no consequences for the results.
22In other words, z contains all the information about a student’s desirability to colleges that he or she does not
initially know but can learn from SAT performance, while η contains all of the information that students do not
initially know and cannot learn from SAT performance.
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normality that these expectations will be
z = E[z|s, q] + ν = γ1q + γ2s+ ν
η = E[η|s, q] + e = α1q + α2s+ e
where e and ν are mean zero normal random variables with variances σ2e and σ
2
ν , and E[se] =
E[sν] = E[qν] = 0. The student then uses these beliefs to select an optimal period 0 application
portfolio,
y0 = Ω0E[y|s, q] (2)
= Ω0 [(δ + α1 + Λγ1)q + (r + α2 + Λγ2)s]
Thus the weight the student places on her self-observable characteristics s and q is the sum of their
direct effect on the choice of portfolio (δ and r), their role in inferring unobservable characteristics
η that affect portfolio choice (α1 and α2), and their role in predicting the unobserved true SAT
score (γ1 and γ2) weighted by the importance of the SAT (Λ). Here Ω0 allows for the possibility
that application strategies may be correlated with aptitude. For example, students may apply to
“reach schools” before they learn their SAT score, but the definition of a reach school may vary
across the population.23
Prior to choosing colleges in period 1, the student learns her score, z1, which acts as a signal
of the true SAT: z1 = z+  where  is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ
2
 . Using
this information, the student forms a new belief of z,
E[z|s, q, z1] = pi1z1 + (1− pi1)(γ1q + γ2s) (3)
where pit = σ
2
ν/(σ
2
 + tσ
2
ν), which follows from Bayesian updating with a normally distributed prior
and signal. Using these beliefs, the student chooses her optimal portfolio in period 1,
y1 = E[y|s, q, z1] (4)
= [δ + α1 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1] q + [r + α2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ2] s+ Λpi1z1
Relative to y0, the introduction of z1 causes the student to reduce her reliance on q and s (evident
from the 1− pi1 term) for predicting z and now places weight on the revealed score z1.
In practice, we observe s and z1 in all periods of the process, but do not observe q. Because
(q, z, s) are jointly normal we can write q = E[q|z, s] = γ3s+γ4z+u. The earned score z1 measures
z with error, so is re-written in terms of the observables as, E[q|s, z1] = [γ3 + γ4(1− φ1)] s+γ4φ1z1.
Here, φ1 is the standard signal-to-noise ratio coefficient from Bayesian updating with a normal prior
and signal. It represents the ability of a single SAT score to predict a student’s SAT relative to
23The analogue in an employer learning context would be a return to experience that is correlated with productivity.
Note that if students increase or decrease the selectivity of their portfolios between periods in a way that is independent
of perceived ability, it will be absorbed by the constant term in a regression.
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the observable characteristics in s, such as student demographics and PSAT scores. In period 0, a
regression of y0 on s and z1 is the linear projection,
24
E∗[Ω0E[y|s, q]|s, z1] ≡ a0s+ b0z1 (5)
where a0 and b0 are the least squares coefficients,
a0 ≡ Ω0 [r + α2 + (δ + α1)(γ3 + γ4(1− φ1)) + Λ(γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− φ1))]
b0 ≡ Ω0 [(δ + α1)γ4φ1 + Λγ1γ4φ1]
Note that the coefficient on the yet to be revealed SAT score reflects both the correlation of the
score with unobservables (δ and α1) and the extent to which students anticipate their SAT scores
(γ1) using these unobservables. Applying the same operation to period 1 data,
E∗[E[y|s, q, z1]|s, z1] ≡ a1s+ b1z1 (6)
where,
a1 ≡ r + α2 + (α1 + δ)(γ3 + γ4(1− φ1)) + Λ(1− pi1)[γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− φ1)]
b1 ≡ (α1 + δ)γ4φ1 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1γ4φ1 + Λpi1
Note that the coefficient on the score again reflects the correlation with unobservables, but also
reflects the effect of the revealed score (Λpi1).
That student strategies may change over time (i.e. Ω0 6= 1) is problematic for comparing the
OLS coefficients, as changes in the estimates may be partially due to changes in strategy. Section
3.3 discusses how Ω0 is estimated. Adjusting for such strategies, the change in the coefficient
estimates is
A10 = a1 − a0
Ω0
= −pi1Λ [γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− φ1)]
B10 = b1 − b0
Ω0
= pi1Λ(1− γ1γ4φ1)
The first equation is unambiguously negative, while the second is unambiguously positive.25 Thus
if students optimally adjust their college portfolio in response to their SAT score, there will be an
increase in the coefficient on z1 and a decrease in the coefficient vector on s in period 1 relative
to period 0. The intuition for this finding is quite clear. When students do not know their SAT
score, they project it based on factors such as the PSAT. When they receive new information
on their SAT-related ability, they use this information and reduce their reliance on other factors
24E∗[A|B] is the linear projection of A on to B.
25This follows from γ2γ4 < 1. To see this, note that z = γ1q + γ2s + ν and q = γ3s + γ4z + u, and thus
z = (γ1γ3 + γ2)s + γ1γ4z + γ1u. This is re-written as (1 − γ1γ4)z = (γ1γ3 + γ2)s + γ1u , which simplifies to
z = γ1γ3+γ2
1−γ1γ4 s+
γ1
1−γ1γ4 u. As E[su] = 0, 1− γ1γ4 < 0 would imply a negative correlation between z and s.
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in forming their beliefs about ability. The model also highlights that the estimated effect of the
SAT is attenuated downward to the extent that students accurately anticipate their future scores
using unobservable factors – which depends on γ1, the extent to which students can predict their
true score z, and φ1, the extent to which a single SAT score actually reflects that true score. As
discussed in Section 2, within-student variation in scores appears to be quite noisy and thus difficult
to predict even with two prior exams in hand. We show in the next section that the magnitude of
anticipation can be explicitly estimated in the case of two-time takers.
3.2 Two-Time Takers
Students have the option to take the SAT twice and the data reveal each score and the timing of
all applications.26 Students select colleges in t = 0 without knowing either SAT score, receive their
first score in t = 1 and choose a new portfolio of colleges, and receive their second score in t = 2
and choose a portfolio with full knowledge of all scores.
The first period analysis follows identically with that of single-score takers. The student
forms expectations on her unobservable factors (z, η) using observable factors (s, q). She then
uses these beliefs to select an optimal period 0 application portfolio, y0 = Ω0E[y|s, q] where Ω0 is
defined as before. In period 1, students observe their first SAT score, z1 and update their beliefs
about z. They then choose a new portfolio as before, with y1 = Ω1E[y|s, q, z1] where Ω1 represents
time-varying differences in the application strategy that are related to ability.27
In period 2, the student learns her second SAT score, z2, and uses all available information
to form a belief about z.
E[z|s, q, z1, z2] = pi2z1 + pi2z2 + (1− 2pi2)(γ1q + γ2s) (7)
She uses these beliefs about z to form a final set of beliefs about her optimal application portfolio,
y2 = E[y|s, q, z1, z2] (8)
= [r + α2 + Λγ2(1− 2pi2)] s+ [δ + α1 + Λγ1(1− 2pi2)] q + Λpi2z1 + Λpi2z2
The same intuition for single test takers applies for the multiple test takers. As the student receives
more information about z, she reduces her reliance on other factors in forming beliefs.
In practice, we observe s and the two test scores, z1 and z2. The expected value of q
conditional on s and z is the same as before. The expectation conditional on the observed test
scores is E[q|s, z1, z2] = [γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] s+ γ4φ2z1 + γ4φ2z2 where φ2 is the standard coefficient
from Bayesian updating with two i.i.d. signals. Regressing y0 on s, z1, and z2 implies the linear
26In principle, this framework can be applied to students who take the SAT three or more times. The predictions
extend naturally, but in practice a modest fraction of students take the exam more than two times during this period.
27As period 2, rather than 1, is the final period, we normalize Ω2 = 1 in this section.
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projection,
E∗[Ω0E[y|s, q]|s, z1, z2] = a0s+ b0z1 + c0z2 (9)
where,
a0 ≡ Ω0 (r + α2 + [δ + α1][γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ[γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)])
b0 ≡ Ω0 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λγ1γ4φ2]
c0 ≡ Ω0 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λγ1γ4φ2]
Note that the coefficients on z1 and z2 are equal in the pre-exam period, so future scores are equally
predictive of pre-exam portfolios. This follows from the assumption that z1 and z2 are i.i.d. draws
from the distribution of z, and allows for an empirical test of this assumption. The magnitude of
these coefficients depends on the extent to which the scores are correlated with unobservables that
predict a student’s score. Estimating the same regression for y1 yields,
E∗[Ω1E[y|s, q, z1]|s, z1, z2] ≡ a1s+ b1z1 + c1z2 (10)
where,
a1 ≡ Ω1 (r + α2 + [δ + α1][γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ(1− pi1)(γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)))
b1 ≡ Ω1 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi1]
c1 ≡ Ω1 [(δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− pi1)γ1γ4φ2]
Of note is that the difference b1 − c1 is Λpi1 (abstracting from Ω1 for the moment). That is, the
coefficient on the second SAT score, which has not been revealed, captures the effect of unobserv-
ables. The additional effect of the first SAT score, which has been revealed, is the effect of new
information. After estimating Ω0 and Ω1, we can compare the regression coefficients,
A10 =
a1
Ω1
− a0
Ω0
= −pi1Λ [γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)]
B10 =
b1
Ω1
− b0
Ω0
= pi1Λ(1− γ1γ4φ2)
C10 =
c1
Ω1
− c0
Ω0
= −pi1Λγ1γ4φ2
As we saw with the single test takers, the arrival of new information causes a shifting of the
magnitude of the coefficients from the old information (s) to the new information (z1). If students
anticipate their true SAT score using unobservable information q, then the coefficient on realized
SAT will be attenuated downward because it contains less new information than we are measuring.28
28Specifically, students may use unobservable information q to partially anticipate their true SAT score. Because
we do not observe q, such anticipation would be reflected in the coefficient on SAT score in period 0. After an actual
score is revealed, the student relies less on q. This reduces the coefficient on SAT in period 1. As a result, B10 is
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In the two-taker case, the coefficient on the second SAT score, C10, measures the magnitude of this
attenuation.29 The difference B10 − C10 is the effect of a student learning about her SAT score on
portfolio choice after adjusting for anticipation. Furthermore, C10 acts as additional evidence of
whether students are able to anticipate their scores.
Now consider the regression of y2 on s, z1, and z2. The linear projection yields,
E∗[E[y|s, q, z1, z2]|s, z1, z2] ≡ a2s+ b2z1 + c2z2 (11)
where,
a2 ≡ r + α2 + (δ + α1)[γ3 + γ4(1− 2φ2)] + Λ(1− 2pi2)(γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2))
b2 ≡ (δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− 2pi2)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi2
c2 ≡ (δ + α1)γ4φ2 + Λ(1− 2pi2)γ1γ4φ2 + Λpi2
Comparing these coefficients to the period 0 estimates,
A20 = a2 − a0
Ω0
= −2pi2Λ [γ2 + γ1γ3 + γ1γ4(1− 2φ2)]
B20 = b2 − b0
Ω0
= pi2Λ(1− 2γ1γ4φ2)
C20 = c2 − c0
Ω0
= pi2Λ(1− 2γ1γ4φ2)
With both scores revealed to the student, the estimates load from s onto both z1 and z2. The more
information the student has on z, the less she relies on s and q to forecast z. As in the pre-score
period, the change in the coefficient on the first and second SAT scores are equivalent after all
scores are revealed. This follows from z1 and z2 being i.i.d. draws from the distribution of z, and
provides another test of this assumption.
3.3 Time-Dependent Strategies
For convenience, we have assumed that we know Ωt, the rate at which strategies change throughout
the application process with respect to ability. There is a simple way to estimate each Ωt. Consider
a regression of yt on s, the time-invariant information about ability that is available to both the
student and researcher in all periods. As originally shown by Farber and Gibbons (1996), this
estimate will simply be E∗[ΩtE[y|s]|s] = ΩtE∗[y|s] where the equality follows from the law of
iterated projections.30 If the coefficient vector s changes in different time periods, it can only be
attenuated by the anticipation term γ1γ4φ1.
29There will be a shifting away from future information (z2) to the extent that the student used unobservable
information q to predict z and relies on this less after learning z1.
30Note that because of the normality assumptions, the linear projection and the conditional expectation are the
same thing, so the law of iterated expectations also applies.
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attributed to changes in strategy. We thus estimate a series of regressions,
yt = dts+ t (12)
The estimate of Ωt is then Ωˆt =
dt
dT
, where T is the time period for which we wish to normalize the
scale (period 1 for one-time takers and period 2 for two-time takers).
4 Estimates of Student Updating
The empirical model reveals several tests of whether or not student choices are consistent with
updating. Upon receiving an SAT score, we should observe increased importance placed on the
realized SAT score and a decrease in importance of other observable factors such as the PSAT.
For students who take the SAT twice, applications should be weighted toward each score as it is
revealed and away from pre-existing factors. Two-time takers also provide an explicit estimate of
and thus correction for the extent to which students anticipate future scores.
Our primary results measure college selectivity as the average SAT score of matriculates, but
we explore alternative characteristics that are also of interest: in and out of state college tuition
levels, four and six year graduation rates, private and public status, and selectivity ratings.31 One
important distinction is between new colleges added to the portfolio in a given time period and the
cumulative portfolio that includes previously selected colleges. A student who initially believes she
is a high type, may reassess downward after receiving a negative score shock. She may respond to
this by applying to additional schools that are of the appropriate level given her new beliefs about
her aptitude. Alternatively, she may overcompensate and apply to even less selective schools in
order to balance her prior mistake, resulting in a portfolio average that she believes is appropriate.
As we are agnostic to how a student should respond, we present outcomes based on both options:
the average characteristics only for new colleges added to the portfolio in period t (new colleges);
and the average of all colleges who received a score up to and including period t (cumulative
portfolio).
4.1 One-Time Takers: Updating
We employ a difference-in-differences style design to estimate if, and to what extent, students
update their portfolios in response to new information. In the case of students who take the exam
one time, we estimate effects using the specification,
yit = β0 + β1si + β2z1i + β31t=1 + β4si1t=1 + β5z1i1t=1 + it (13)
31Black and Smith (2006) detail the potential pitfalls of using a single measure of college quality. Thus we present
a range of outcomes and also consider a college quality index based on factor analysis. The use of ordinal variables,
such as happiness and test scores, in the left-hand side of regressions has come under criticism by Bond and Lang
(2013, 2014). Our results are robust to multiple polynomial transformations of our quality measure, including both
highly left-skewed and highly-right skewed transformations. We will also analyze other quality measures and find
similar results, providing further evidence that our results are not due to arbitrary scaling.
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where, for simplicity, we can think of si as a student’s PSAT score (though we also include household
income, high school grade point average, race, and geographic location in the specification), z1 is
the student’s SAT score, and 1t=1 is indicator for the report being sent after the score is revealed.
32
The outcomes yit are the average characteristics of the colleges selected before and after the score
is revealed to the student, with one observation per student per period. The coefficients β1 and
β2 correspond to a0 and b0 in the empirical model. The coefficient β4 represents A10, the change
in weight on the PSAT after the SAT score is revealed, and β5 represents B10, the change in the
weight on the SAT.33
If students update, then β4 < 0 and β5 > 0. Recall that B10 = pi1Λ(1 − γ1γ4φ1), where
pi1Λ is the effect of the unexpected information shock on college application choice. The point
estimates understate the true amount of updating by γ1γ4φ1. This attenuation will be small if: a)
students are unable to anticipate their true scores using unobservables (γ1 is small); or b) a single
realized SAT score is a noisy measure of the true score (φ1 is small). In other words, if students
are unable to anticipate their true scores or realized SAT scores are noisy draws relative to the
true score, then there should be little or no attenuation because the realized score is truly a shock.
The distribution of PSAT, first SAT, and second SAT scores, presented in Section 2 was suggestive
that scores are indeed quite noisy in the sense that they vary dramatically within student and
are difficult to predict based on observables. For example, the fraction of students who perform
better the second time they take the exam is split nearly fifty-fifty. Furthermore, the identification
design is not sensitive to time-varying factors.34 This is due to the fact that students choose their
pre-exam college portfolios shortly prior to taking the SAT, whereas the post-exam portfolios are
selected some time after scores are released. Thus, if anything, the pre-exam portfolio and not the
post-exam portfolio should be correlated with time-varying factors that cause positive or negative
performance shocks on exam day. Furthermore, those who take the exam two times provide an
opportunity to explicitly estimate the extent to which students anticipate future scores.35
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 present the results of specification 13 for new colleges added
to the portfolio. The estimates are consistent with updating in response to new information.
Students place greater weight on the SAT score after it is revealed and reduce the weight placed
on the PSAT. In column (1), which includes a rich set of student characteristic controls, the point
32Note that by interacting observable characteristics with the post-exam indicator, we account for changes to college
portfolio composition that are common across students who have the same demographic characteristics, household
resources, and who live in the same zip code or attend the same high school. In line with the employer learning
literature, we present results using a linear functional form for SAT and PSAT to ease interpretation. Allowing these
variables to enter in a flexible polynomial leads to qualitatively similar results.
33A natural alternative is a first-differenced specification in which the change in the college portfolio is regressed on
the change in the score (PSAT −SAT ). We prefer a difference-in-differences design because it does not assume that
changes in the SAT and PSAT are given equal weight by the student (i.e. that a one point decrease in PSAT scores
generates that same effect as a one point increase in SAT score), though in practice the results should be similar.
Further, this design is naturally extended to the case of two-time takers.
34Such factors could include performance in high school, participation in test preparation classes, or changes in
motivation.
35This test is especially compelling because the colleges selected after the first SAT are often selected as free score
reports prior to taking the exam a second time. Thus, if time-varying factors generate bias, this should be reflected
most strongly in the coefficient on the second SAT score.
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estimates suggest a 100 point increase in SAT score leads to a 7 point increase in the selectivity of
the application portfolio. Given the scaling of the SAT and the distribution of SAT scores among
college matriculates, this roughly corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in SAT score
leading to a 0.12 standard deviation in college selectivity. This point estimate is roughly unchanged
when we include zip code fixed effects in column (2) and high school fixed effects in column (3);
in each case interacted with the period indicator to account for changes in portfolio composition
that are common to a school or community.36 The magnitude of the effect represents the effect
of the information shock (pi1Λ) less attenuation that occurs if students anticipate their scores (i.e.
γ1γ4φ1). Thus this result can be viewed as a lower bound of the causal effect of new information
on the college application decision.37 In the case of two-time takers, we estimate and adjust for
this attenuation explicitly and find little evidence of score anticipation.
Students may systematically employ strategies that vary with time, such as selecting colleges
more or less ambitiously during the pre- and post-exam periods. If these strategies are shifts in levels
common across all students then they will not affect the estimates – the indicator for the period will
absorb the change in levels. However, if strategies reflect a scaling up or down of portfolio quality,
then they necessarily vary across student aptitude. Following the approach outlined in Section 3.3,
we account for this by regressing the outcome of interest on information available to the student
(i.e. the PSAT and demographic characteristics) interacted with an indicator for each time period.
We then calculate Ωt, the time-varying relationship between ability and portfolio choice as the ratio
between the return to ability in the final period to return to ability in period t.38 Thus our ability
covariates have a roughly time-constant relationship to our adjusted portfolios ytΩt . The estimates
of Ωt presented in Appendix A indicate that higher ability students tend to be more aggressive with
their post-exam applications. Thus adjusting for time-varying strategies results in slightly smaller
estimates of student response to new SAT information, as shown in column (4).39
In columns (5)-(6) we measure the effect of student updating in terms of the cumulative
selectivity of the portfolio. These results also suggest that students update in response to new
information. After adjusting for time-varying strategies, our point estimates suggest that a 100
point positive shock to SAT score leads to an increase in the selectivity of one’s application portfolio
of 2.1 SAT points. There is a similar pattern of effects when considering other measures of portfolio
composition as shown in Table 4. The least selective college selected after the score is revealed does
not appear to be sensitive to the score shock, but the most selective is quite sensitive. This is
consistent with a case in which students apply to a safety college regardless of new information but
36Section 4.4 examines the estimates when using the joint sample of one and two-time takers. The resulting point
estimate of 0.055 is similar to the estimate for one-time takers only. Note that our preferred results are based on the
split samples as they allow us to consider repeated instances of within-student updating for those who take the exam
multiple times.
37As discussed in the previous section, measurement error in SAT scores, and our rich set of student controls would
suggest that γ1γ4φ1 is small, and thus our estimate may not significantly understate the causal effect.
38As the data include multiple time-invariant measures of aptitude, there are multiple possible estimates of Ωt. We
estimate Ωt using the PSAT, but the results are not sensitive to selecting other measures or using an average.
39As these regressions use variables modified by a scalar imputed from the same dataset and sample, we calculate
our standard errors via bootstrapping.
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only apply to a reach college if they experience a positive shock. Higher SAT score shocks result
in students selecting a higher fraction of private colleges, colleges with higher average tuition, and
colleges with higher graduation rates.40 For example, students who score 100 points higher on the
SAT appear to apply to colleges with in-state tuition that is 400 dollars greater per year. Average
in-state tuition for public universities during this period is 6,900 dollars, while average tuition
across all universities is 13,250 dollars. The estimates for each characteristic of the portfolio reflect
decreased weight placed on the PSAT after the SAT score is revealed. Strategy adjusted estimates
for each outcome are presented in Appendix A. They closely mirror the unadjusted estimates in
terms of both sign and magnitude, indicating that the results are not due to stronger students
employing systematically different application patterns.
4.2 Two-Time Takers: Updating
Students who take the SAT more than one time provide especially compelling evidence of updating.
In this context, the first and second information shocks are both generated by an SAT score, so there
is no concern that students perceive the exams as fundamentally different in terms of importance or
information content. Observing the responses to multiple shocks necessarily increases the credibility
of estimates, as the probability that some unobserved, time-varying confounder would coincide with
the treatment on multiple occasions is quite low. Further, the second score acts as a natural test
of bias during the period when only the first score has been revealed.
Students who take the SAT twice receive two information shocks and send reports during
three periods. Thus the specification is,
yit = β0 + β1si + β2z1i + β3z2i + β41t=1 + β51t=2 (14)
+β6si1t=1 + β7z1i1t=1 + β8z2i1t=1
+β9si1t=2 + β10z1i1t=2 + β11z2i1t=2 + it
where z1i and z2i are the student’s first and second SAT scores. The coefficient β7 represents
B10, the change in weight the student gives to the first SAT after the score is revealed, and β11
represents C20 the change in weight the student gives to the second SAT after it is revealed. The
coefficients β6 and β9 represent A10 and A20, the changes in weight given to the PSAT as each SAT
score is revealed. The coefficient on the second SAT when only the first SAT has been revealed,
β8, is a measure of the extent to which students anticipate their scores using unobservables. Thus
interpreting magnitudes for multiple test takers is especially appealing. As shown in Section 3.2,
B10 − C10 = pi1Λ. Thus, the estimated effect of new information is β7 − β8.
The results in Table 5 provide compelling evidence that students incorporate new information
from each score. Beginning with newly selected colleges in columns (1)-(4), we see that after the
first SAT score is revealed, the portfolio is less sensitive to the PSAT, reducing the coefficient by
40The pattern of effects is nearly identical when considering additional outcomes such as six year graduation rate,
Barron’s selectivity ratings, and a college selectivity index based on factor analysis.
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0.02, and is more sensitive to the first SAT, increasing the coefficient by 0.05. Likewise, when the
second SAT score is revealed, the portfolio discounts the PSAT even more, with a coefficient of
-0.035, and a large change for the second SAT score, an increase in the coefficient of 0.078. The
magnitude of the adjustments toward the first and second SAT scores as they are revealed are
similar to the estimates of updating for one-time takers in the previous section. Cross-sectional
difference for two time takers are 19 points for the first exam and 18 points for the second exam,
again indicating that causal estimates of updating are about one-third of the differences observed
in the cross-section.
As explained above, the coefficient on the second SAT when only the first SAT has been
revealed provides a direct measure of attenuation bias due to students anticipating future scores.
Once adjusting for time-varying strategies in column (4), we find that the coefficient is negative as
expected.41 Importantly, the estimate is small and statistically insignificant. That is, we do not find
evidence that students are able to anticipate their scores in such a way that it significantly biases
the estimates. This is consistent with the noisy within-student distribution of scores in Section 2
and our inability to accurately predict them.
We compute the effect of the first SAT less the estimated effect of anticipation, β7−β8. With
this adjustment, a 100 point positive SAT score shock is estimated to cause a student to increase her
college portfolio selectivity by 4.5 points. Note that the pattern of effects is similar when adjusting
or not adjusting for strategy. Also of interest is the estimated response to the shock generated by
the second SAT score. The estimates indicate that a 100 point higher score on the second SAT
increases portfolio selectivity by 6.2 points. In contrast, students do not appear to use information
from the first SAT in choosing new colleges after receiving the second SAT score. That is, students
rely most heavily on new information when adjusting their portfolios. This suggests that the final
portfolio will reflect both the first and second SAT.
The estimated effects of updating for the cumulative portfolio are presented in columns (5)
and (6). After the first score has been revealed and prior to the second score being revealed (After
SAT 1), only the first score is reflected in the portfolio. Adjusting for time-varying strategies, we
see that a 100 point shock on their first SAT score causes students to adjust their portfolio upward
by 2 points. Note that the bias generated by anticipation is only 0.1 points, as indicated by the
coefficient on the second score. After both exams have been revealed to the student (After SAT
2), the first and second score have identical effects on the cumulative portfolio. That is, students
appear to select new colleges in such a way that the final portfolio reflects both the first and second
scores equally.
Specification (6) provides evidence of two predictions from the model. First, if SAT scores
are i.i.d. draws conditional on ability from a students perspective, then they should be given equal
weight prior to either being revealed in period 0. The estimated coefficients are 0.111 and 0.119,
41Note that in columns (1)-(3) our estimate for β8, the amount of bias in our estimate of the effect of an information
shock, is positive, when the model predicts it to be negative after accounting for strategy. This reflects that high
ability students are more aggressive in their application decisions after learning their SAT, independent of that score
outcome.
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respectively, and a formal test fails to reject that they are equal. Likewise, after both scores are
revealed, they should be given equal additional weight for the cumulative portfolio. Again, the
estimates are very similar with values of 0.015 and 0.014 and are not statistically different.
Table 6 presents alternate measures of portfolio composition.42 We again observe that the
increase in selectivity stems primarily from the most selective colleges, with the least selective
colleges remaining similar regardless of the shock. A 100 point increase in the first SAT score
results in a portfolio with in-state tuition that is 300 dollars higher. Likewise, a positive score
shock of 100 points on the second SAT produces an increase of 400 dollars, which corresponds to 6
percent of average in-state public tuition at four-year colleges. Positive information shocks result in
students selecting colleges that have higher four-year graduation rates and a larger fraction of the
portfolio consisting of private colleges. These findings are supported by specifications that adjust
for time-varying strategies that are correlated with aptitude as shown in Appendix A. Of particular
note is that relative to the pre-score period, only revealed scores are significantly incorporated into
portfolio choice in each period. This strongly supports the hypothesis that students incorporate new
information into portfolio choice and that they do not anticipate future scores using unobservables.
4.3 Heterogeneity in Updating
Student responses to new information may vary with gender, race, household resources, or the
nature of the information shock. Those from higher or lower income households may respond
more or less to new information. For example, students whose parents are unfamiliar with the
college application process may respond less to a change in information if they apply to a fixed
set of local colleges. Conversely, lower incomes students may respond more if they rely on having
multiple admissions offers in order to negotiate for greater financial aid, or if the SAT substitutes
for other forms of college counseling. The results in Table 7 indicate that students of all races
and income ranges update significantly. A specification with interacted effects indicates that black
students update more than white students, but that there are no significant differences across
income groups. Though male students have slightly larger coefficients than female students, the
differences in updating are not statistically significant. Perhaps most interestingly, students who
receive positive shocks, where the SAT exceeds the predicted SAT, appear to be more responsive
than students who receive negative shocks.43 This is consistent with the finding that the change in
portfolio quality was primarily driven by the most selective college selected. Students may apply
to safer schools regardless of their performance on the SAT, but only those who receive unexpected
positive news choose to add more selective colleges to their portfolios.
Table 8 presents estimates by subgroup for two-time takers. All groups exhibit a consistent
pattern with portfolios reflecting new information from the first SAT and second SAT as it is
revealed to the student. Newly revealed first scores are highly significant and yet to be revealed
42As with the single test takers, we estimate these effects for newly selected colleges. Results using the cumulative
portfolio yield a similar pattern of results.
43See Section 2 for details about how the predicted SAT was estimated.
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second SAT scores are not. This supports the hypothesis that no subgroup of students anticipates
future scores in a significant way. For example, there is no evidence that higher income students
appear to more accurately anticipate score shocks due to test prep classes. Again, the results do
not suggest strong heterogeneity. Only two of the findings for one-time takers appear to carryover
to students who take the exam twice: male students update more than female students after the
first and second scores are released, which is statistically significant in this case; and those who
receive two positive shocks update more than those who receive two negative shocks.
4.4 Extensive Margin Retaking and Score Reports
There are two extensive margins of interest: taking the exam once or twice; and sending additional
reports after a score is revealed. We explicitly examine how student and household characteristics
and the size of the SAT information shock appear to affect these two margins. To abstract from
selection into retaking the exam, we merge one and two-time takers and replicate the primary
design. We also estimate a lower bound estimate by assuming that all students who do not send
additional reports did not update their beliefs.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 indicate that students whose SAT score are lower than their
PSAT scores are more likely to retake the exam, while those whose SAT score exceeds their PSAT
scores are less likely to retake it.44 However, the magnitudes of these estimates are relatively
modest, with a 100 point negative shock only increasing the retake rate by 2 percentage points and
a 100 point positive shock decreasing the rate by 5 percentage points. By comparison, students
from the highest income category are 9 percentage points more likely to take the exam than those
in the lowest income category. One- and two-time takers are treated separately in the empirical
analysis and result in similar patterns of estimates. To ensure that separating the sample on this
margin is not biasing the estimates, we present estimates for the joint sample in Table 10. The
results indicate that a 100 point test score shock causes a 5.5 point increase in the average score
of matriculates in the college portfolio. This is consistent with the separate estimates presented in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Because reports must be sent after the exam in order to measure updating, the results are
local to students who send more than the four free reports. While this is not a threat to the internal
validity of the design, it does affect the interpretation of the estimates. Specifically, students in
the sample used for analysis may have different socio-economic characteristics and may be more or
less sensitive to new information than the population of all SAT takers. The decision to have more
than four colleges in one’s portfolio may be determined by factors unrelated to the newly revealed
score, such as household income or college readiness, or it may be a response to the amount that
beliefs are updated in response to the score shock.
As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, students from higher income households and
students with high grade point averages in high school are significantly more likely to send additional
44See Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) for an examination of retaking behavior among applicants to three selective
universities.
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score reports.45 Thus these students are over-represented in the sample. In contrast, the estimates
reveal little evidence that students who update the most are more or less likely to send additional
score reports. Specifically, the coefficient on the magnitude of the information shock, approximated
by the absolute value of the difference between the SAT and PSAT score, indicates that a 100 point
shock changes the probability of sending additional reports by less than one percentage point.46
This suggests that the amount of updating a student experiences as a result of the exam does not
significantly affect the number of colleges in her portfolio.47
Thus the number of colleges a student includes in her portfolio appears to be primarily a
function of characteristics such as household income and performance in high school, and is only
marginally affected by updating in response to the score shock. Thus we have no evidence that
the estimates in the analysis are systematically larger or smaller than those for the population
as a whole. Nonetheless, we estimate the lower bound by assuming that all students who do not
send additional reports did not update their beliefs. In practice, this is done by replacing missing
post-exam portfolios with pre-exam portfolios. The resulting estimates are presented in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 10. While these are mechanically smaller than the primary estimates, they
nonetheless exhibit the same pattern of updating.
5 Conclusion
Relatively little is known about the extent to which students update their human capital decisions
in response to new information about their aptitude. For example, it is unknown if such information
can significantly close the gap between students with similar aptitude but from households with
differing levels of resources. Research in this area is challenging due to the fact that many decisions
are observed one time. The few studies that have made progress to this end have elicited beliefs
using repeated surveys. This paper exploits a unique policy in conjunction with administrative
data to overcome this issue in the context of college application portfolios. Specifically, we observe
students selecting colleges to be in their portfolios before and after receiving SAT scores.
We find consistent evidence that students adjust their college application portfolios in re-
sponse to new information about their aptitude and the strength of their applications. Information
shocks associated with the SAT cause students to apply to more selective colleges that charge higher
tuition and have higher graduation rates. After SAT scores are revealed, students rely less on prior
45A one point increase in grade point average (on a 4 point scale) is correlated with an 8 percentage point higher
probability of adding colleges to a student’s portfolio. Students from households with income exceeding 100,000
dollars are 5 percentage points more likely to send additional reports than a student from a household with income
of less than 50,000 dollars.
46In terms of the overall number of reports sent to colleges, a 100 point score shock is estimated to increase the
size of the portfolio by 0.04 score reports.
47If students who update their beliefs the most are more (less) likely to send more reports, then the estimated
effects would over (under) represent the population average. The amount that students update their beliefs depends
on the interaction of two factors: the size of the information shock |SAT-PSAT| (which is observable), and sensitivity
to new information (which is not observable). Thus, the finding that |SAT −PSAT | has almost no effect on sending
additional reports is suggestive that more or less sensitive students may not be systematically over-represented in the
analysis.
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sources of information such as the PSAT. This is apparent both for students who take the exam
one time and thus experience one information shock and students who take the exam twice and
experience two information shocks.
A point of policy interest is identifying ways to close the gap in outcomes between students
from higher and lower income households. College entrance exam results, which are revealed to
nearly all students considering a four-year college, provide students with standardized feedback
about the strength of their college applications and potential for success in college. The results
in this paper suggest that the SAT plays a role in bringing college portfolios into alignment with
academic performance. However, there appears to be a significant amount of inertia in portfolio
choice. The reason for this inertia is an open question and ripe for future research. For example,
the magnitude of student updating may vary with the timeliness and salience of new information
about aptitude. The answers may help to improve the way in which students, parents, and school
counselors receive and respond to critical information in the application process.
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Figure 1: Distribution of SAT Scores and Portfolio Quality
A. Distribution of First SAT Scores
B. Distribution of Pre-Exam College Portfolios
Note: The top figure presents the score distribution of students’ first SAT scores. The score is measured in multiples
of 10 points. The standard deviation of the distribution is 200 points. The bottom figure presents the distribution of
the average SAT scores of matriculates of colleges in each students’ score report portfolio (one measure of portfolio
quality). The standard deviation of the distribution is 110 points.
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Figure 2: Within-Student Variation in Scores: First SAT vs PSAT and Predicted SAT
A. First SAT - PSAT
B. First SAT - Predicted First SAT
Note: The top figure presents the difference between a student’s SAT and PSAT scores. The PSAT score has been
multiplied by 10 to be on the same scale as the SAT. The standard deviation of the difference is 86.5 points. The
bottom figure presents the difference between the first SAT score and the predicted SAT. The SAT score is predicted
using the PSAT, grade point average, gender, race, parental income, and the average score for matriculates of colleges
selected to receive score reports prior to taking the exam. The standard deviation of the difference is 80.5 points.
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Figure 3: Within-Student Variation in Scores: Second SAT vs First SAT and Predicted SAT
A. Second SAT - First SAT
B. Second SAT - Predicted Second SAT
Note: The top figure presents the difference between a student’s second SAT and first SAT scores. The standard
deviation of the difference is 70.3 points. The bottom figure presents the difference between the second SAT score
and the predicted second SAT. The SAT score is predicted using the PSAT, first SAT, grade point average, gender,
race, parental income, and the average score for matriculates of colleges selected to receive score reports prior to
taking the exam. The standard deviation of the difference is 63.6 points.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3)
One-Time Takers
Male 627,190 0.470 0.499
White 627,190 0.588 0.492
Black 627,190 0.161 0.368
Hispanic 627,190 0.158 0.365
Other Race 627,190 0.093 0.290
PSAT score 627,190 972.0 208.6
Took PSAT as Junior 627,190 0.811 0.392
SAT Score 627,190 1009.3 213.5
Number Reports Before SAT 627,190 3.169 1.600
Sent Reports After SAT 627,190 0.206 0.404
Two-Time Takers
Male 534,399 0.452 0.498
White 534,399 0.604 0.489
Black 534,399 0.138 0.345
Hispanic 534,399 0.128 0.334
Other Race 534,399 0.131 0.337
PSAT Score 534,399 1010.8 192.1
Took PSAT as Junior 534,399 0.857 0.350
First SAT 534,399 1038.0 190.6
Second SAT 534,399 1064.4 196.6
Number Reports Before First SAT 534,399 3.674 1.859
Number Reports After First SAT 534,399 2.778 2.545
Sent Reports After First SAT 534,399 0.698 0.459
Sent Reports After Second SAT 534,399 0.324 0.468
Note: This table presents summary statistics for students who took the SAT one time (top panel) and two times
(bottom panel) and who took the PSAT as a sophomore or junior in high school. The cohorts included in the
analysis graduated between 2007 and 2009. “Reports” refer to Score Sends sent by the College Board to colleges
at the request of the student. Note that the PSAT score has been multiplied by 10 to be on a comparable scale
to the SAT score.
31
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Correlates of Portfolio Quality
One-Time Taker Two-Time Taker
Colleges Chosen Colleges Chosen Colleges Chosen
After SAT After First SAT After Second SAT
(1) (2) (3)
SAT 1 Score 0.217*** 0.194*** 0.119***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
SAT 2 Score 0.184***
(0.004)
PSAT Score 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
High School GPA 50.052*** 40.738*** 50.400***
(0.623) (0.302) (0.558)
Male 3.949*** 8.293*** 0.410
(0.598) (0.280) (0.492)
Asian 32.117*** 30.919*** 26.533***
(1.174) (0.554) (0.844)
Black 10.700*** 12.917*** 18.361***
(1.131) (0.527) (0.990)
Hispanic 21.029*** 24.790*** 24.104***
(1.079) (0.539) (0.931)
Parental Income 50-100k -3.467*** -4.315*** -5.989***
(0.877) (0.407) (0.772)
Parental Income 100k+ 4.205*** 4.368*** 1.525**
(0.880) (0.434) (0.746)
Observations 128,680 372,232 172,720
R-squared 0.370 0.372 0.387
Note: This table presents the cross-sectional estimates of SAT and PSAT scores on college portfolio quality.
Column (1) examines colleges selected after the SAT for one-time takers. Column (2) examines colleges selected
after the first SAT for students who take the exam twice. Column (3) examines colleges selected after the second
SAT for students who take the exam twice. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 3: One-Time Takers: Portfolio Updating in Response to the SAT
Average SAT of Matriculates
New Colleges Added to Portfolio Cumulative Portfolio
Adjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSAT Score 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.132*** 0.116*** 0.123***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
SAT Score 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.149***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) (0.004)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) (0.005)
Student Controls (x Post) X X X X X X
High School FEs (x Post) X
Zip Code FEs (x Post) X X X X
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036 258,036
R-squared 0.360 0.339 0.359 0.397
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative specifications. Columns (1)-(4) present the change in the average SAT of matriculating
students at colleges selected before and after a student’s score is revealed. Columns (5) and (6) present the change
in the cumulative portfolio as a result. The estimates in columns (4) and (6) have been adjusted to account for
strategies that are correlated with student aptitude. Student controls include high school grade point average,
race, and household income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the
post period. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Bootstrapped errors are used in columns (4) and
(6) to account for the fact that the adjusted outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt. The symbols *, **, and
*** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 4: One-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.097*** 0.126*** 0.021*** 7.471*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.298) (0.001)
SAT Score 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.020*** 7.475*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.304) (0.001)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.044*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -2.993*** -0.005***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.444) (0.001)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.011* 0.118*** 0.011*** 4.093*** 0.010***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.459) (0.001)
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 257,919 256,947
R-squared 0.212 0.322 0.081 0.171 0.291
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative measures of quality. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and
highest average SAT score of matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction
of colleges in the portfolio that are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers
the average in-state tuition for colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four
years for colleges in the portfolio. Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household
income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard
errors are clustered at the zip code level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 5: Two-Time Takers: Portfolio Updating in Response to Each SAT
Average SAT of Matriculates
New Colleges Added to Portfolio Cumulative Portfolio
Adjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSAT Score 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.084***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SAT 1 Score 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.111***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
SAT 2 Score 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.127*** 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.119***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.010* -0.016***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.011*** 0.011* 0.011* -0.004 0.007 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.017*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.019*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.000 0.024*** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.062*** 0.024*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Student Controls (x Post) X X X X X X
High School FEs (x Post) X
Zip Code FEs (x Post) X X X X
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,506
R-squared 0.388 0.377 0.389 0.442
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative specifications. Columns (1)-(4) present the change in the average SAT of matriculating
students at colleges selected before and after students’ first and second SAT scores are revealed. Columns (5)
and (6) present the change in the cumulative portfolio as a result. The estimates in columns (4) and (6) have
been adjusted to account for strategies that are correlated with student aptitude. Student controls include high
school grade point average, race, and household income. Bootstrapped errors are used in columns (4) and (6) to
account for the fact that the adjusted outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt. Each specification includes the
interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post periods. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code
level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 6: Two-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.017*** 5.483*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.362) (0.001)
SAT 1 Score 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.020*** 6.735*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.425) (0.001)
SAT 2 Score 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.010*** 4.819*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.411) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.017** -0.021*** -0.004* -1.164** -0.003***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.506) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.007*** 2.937*** 0.007***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.600) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.977* 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.576) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.059*** -0.022*** -0.009*** -2.858*** -0.006***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.553) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.024*** 0.017* -0.001 0.449 0.003**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.645) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.015** 0.131*** 0.010*** 4.036*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.622) (0.001)
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,378 333,687
R-squared 0.241 0.336 0.095 0.182 0.315
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for alternative measures of quality. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and
highest average SAT score of matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction
of colleges in the portfolio that are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers
the average in-state tuition for colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four
years for colleges in the portfolio. Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household
income. Each specification includes the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard
errors are clustered at the zip code level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 9: Extensive Margins: Retaking and Score Reports
Retook SAT Sent Post-Exam Reports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
| SAT - PSAT | -0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
| SAT - PSAT | *Positive -0.0007*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PSAT Score -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
High School GPA 0.1058*** 0.1144*** 0.0788*** 0.0764***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Male -0.0215*** -0.0164*** -0.0165*** -0.0179***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Asian 0.0881*** 0.0852*** 0.0341*** 0.0349***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Black -0.0031* -0.0114*** 0.0597*** 0.0620***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Hispanic -0.0163*** -0.0214*** -0.0012 0.0003
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Parental Income 50-100k 0.0570*** 0.0585*** 0.0331*** 0.0327***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Parental Income 100k+ 0.0904*** 0.0923*** 0.0499*** 0.0494***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Observations 1,157,855 1,157,855 1,157,855 1,157,855
R-squared 0.066 0.070 0.073 0.073
Note: This table examines the determinants of whether students retake the SAT and whether they send additional
score reports. Columns (1) and (2) examine the extent to which student characteristics, household characteristics,
and the magnitude of the score shock are correlated with retaking the exam. Columns (3) and (4) examine
the extent to which these factors are correlated with sending additional score reports after taking the exam.
The specifications includes the number and quality of reports sent prior to taking the SAT as additional control
variables. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 10: Joint Sample and Lower Bounds
Joint Sample Lower Bound Lower Bound
One and Two One-Time Takers Two-Time Takers
Time Takers [No Updating] [No Updating]
(1) (2) (3)
PSAT Score 0.129*** 0.086*** 0.067***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
SAT 1 Score 0.128*** 0.086*** 0.084***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
SAT 2 Score 0.087***
(0.002)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.009*** -0.002 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.055*** 0.014*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score 0.007**
(0.003)
Students 240,541 627,190 534,399
Observations 481,082 1,254,380 1,603,197
R-squared 0.388 0.233 0.336
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio for a joint sample of one- and two-time takers in column (1) and under the assumption of no updating
for students who do not send additional reports in columns (2) and (3). Each column presents the change in the
average SAT of matriculating students at colleges selected before and after a student’s score is revealed. Student
controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes the
interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code
level. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
40
Appendix
41
A Strategy Adjusted Estimates
The section presents revised estimates after accounting for strategies that are correlated with stu-
dent aptitude. This is important if higher aptitude students systematically apply more or less
aggressively after receiving their scores.
A.1 Estimating Strategy
As introduced in Section 3.3, we can estimate time-varying strategies that are correlated with
aptitude by estimating yt = dts+ t for the outcome of interest yt on a measure of aptitude s that
is known to the student in every period. The estimate of time-varying strategy relative to the last
period T is Ωˆt =
dt
dT
. This captures how portfolio characteristics vary across period as a function
of the measure of student aptitude.
Table A1 presents estimates of Ωt using the PSAT as the measure of aptitude known to the
student in every period. Values less than 1 indicate that the outcome is systematically larger in
the post exam period for students with higher measures of aptitude (i.e. the d0 < d1 for one-
time takers and d0 < d2 or d1 < d2 for two-time takers). This appears to be the case for 5 of
the 7 outcomes, suggesting that higher aptitude students are generally more aggressive with their
post-exam portfolio than are lower aptitude students.
A.2 Adjusted Estimates for Alternative Outcomes
The strategy adjusted estimates are included for the primary measure of college quality, SAT of
matriculates, in Tables 3 and 5 of the text. We present the equivalent estimates for alternative
outcomes in Tables A2 and A3. These estimates indicate strong evidence of updating in response to
new information. For one-time takers, post-exam portfolios significantly discount the information
in the PSAT while placing significantly greater weight on the newly revealed SAT scores. Likewise,
for two-time takers, students only place additional weight on the first and second scores after they
are revealed. Importantly, there is no evidence that the second score is incorporated significantly
when only the first score has been revealed. This provides strong evidence that students do not
anticipate future scores. This evidence is strengthened by the timing of when students select their
portfolios. Specifically, colleges selected after the first exam are frequently chosen shortly before
taking the SAT for a second time (as one of the student’s four free reports). Thus, if time-varying
covariates are generating bias, reports sent after the first exam is taken should be more correlated
with the second score than the first score.
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Table A1: Estimates of Strategy Adjustment: Omega
New Cumulative Min Max Percent In-State Grad
SAT SAT SAT SAT Private Tuition Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
One-Time Takers
Omega (t=0) 0.883 0.949 1.206 0.751 1.063 0.967 0.898
(0.010) 0.010 (0.020) (0.009) (0.031) (0.018) (0.012)
Two-Time Takers
Omega (t=0) 0.861 0.919 1.135 0.712 1.061 0.948 0.866
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.026) (0.016) (0.011)
Omega (t=1) 0.972 0.980 1.258 0.810 1.180 1.073 0.978
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.029) (0.018) (0.011)
Note: This table presents the estimates of time-varying strategy Ωt. The top and bottom panels present the
adjustments used for one and two-time takers, respectively. Estimates are based on changes in the outcome
variable between periods as a function of performance on the PSAT. The resulting estimates are used to adjust
the outcomes presented in Tables A2 and A3.
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Table A2: One-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality (Adjusted)
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.081*** 0.169*** 0.020*** 7.733*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.280) (0.001)
SAT Score 0.106*** 0.195*** 0.019*** 7.726*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.343) (0.001)
After SAT * PSAT Score -0.027*** -0.061*** -0.011*** -3.346*** -0.007***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.405) (0.001)
After SAT * SAT Score 0.032*** 0.071*** 0.012*** 3.924*** 0.008***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.475) (0.001)
Observations 258,036 258,036 258,036 257,919 256,947
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio after adjusting for application strategies. The outcomes are adjusted as detailed in Section 3.3 prior
to estimation. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and highest average SAT score of
matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction of colleges in the portfolio that
are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers the average in-state tuition for
colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four years for colleges in the portfolio.
Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes
the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to
account for the fact that the outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt.
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Table A3: Two-Time Takers: Alternate Measures of Portfolio Quality (Adjusted)
Min Max Percent In-State 4-Year
SAT SAT Private Tuition Grad Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSAT Score 0.061*** 0.115*** 0.016*** 5.779*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.350) (0.001)
SAT 1 Score 0.078*** 0.145*** 0.019*** 7.166*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.433) (0.001)
SAT 2 Score 0.096*** 0.139*** 0.010*** 5.035*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.411) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * PSAT Score -0.019*** -0.039*** -0.005 -1.736 -0.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.446) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 1 Score 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.004** 1.755*** 0.006***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.569) (0.001)
After SAT 1 * SAT 2 Score -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.392 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.536) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * PSAT Score -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.009*** -3.169*** -0.007***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.518) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 1 Score 0.034*** -0.026** 0.000 0.010 0.000
(0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.691) (0.001)
After SAT 2 * SAT 2 Score 0.029*** 0.092*** 0.010*** 3.848*** 0.009***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.644) (0.001)
Observations 334,506 334,506 334,506 334,378 333,687
Note: This table presents the estimated effect of newly revealed SAT scores on a student’s choice of college
portfolio after adjusting for application strategies. The outcomes are adjusted as detailed in Section 3.3 prior
to estimation. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) correspond to the lowest and highest average SAT score of
matriculating students among colleges in the portfolio. Column (3) is the fraction of colleges in the portfolio that
are private not-for-profit (rather than public or for-profit). Column (4) considers the average in-state tuition for
colleges in the portfolio and column (5) is the average graduation rate within four years for colleges in the portfolio.
Student controls include high school grade point average, race, and household income. Each specification includes
the interaction of the controls with an indicator for the post period. Bootstrapped standard errors are used to
account for the fact that the outcomes incorporate the estimates of Ωt.
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